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ABSTRACT
Satellite ground networks are exposed to an increasing number of targeted cyber threats. Successful cyber-attacks
have resulted in substantial data leaks and billions of dollars in material damages. SmallSat ground networks have
distinct cyber security challenges associated with mission-unique equipment; specialized protocols; untimely
patching due to configuration freezes and high regression test costs; and tight budgetary constraints.
Recognizing that SmallSat ground network operators may lack the resources and budgets of traditional satellite
ground operators, it is beneficial to leverage lessons learned, frameworks and tools from Government and Industry
to help better defend their networks.
This paper is intended to be a security primer for SmallSat ground network operators, discussing security best
practices such as Information Assurance (IA) hardening and continuous monitoring; leveraging frameworks such as
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) Security Technical Information Guides (STIGs); and tools such as
Security Information & Event Managers (SIEM) and Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) compliant
applications.
Beyond the technical controls that are often the initial thought for network designers, a solid security program must
include policies and procedures to help manage the security and organizational needs of the ground network. The
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) publishes guides and frameworks that should be used to help
establish and drive policy.
architectures historically are located in secure areas
with stand-alone networks consisting of specialized
serial-based hardware and software using proprietary
protocols. Over the years, the industry has shifted
towards lower-cost commercial-off-the-shelf Internet
Protocol (IP) enabled devices and the use of Wide Area
Networks (WANs), which increases the possibility of
cyber threats.

THREAT OVERVIEW
With numerous examples in recent news reports, it
should come as no surprise that cyber security attacks
are on the rise. Verizon’s 2016 Data Breach
Investigations Report summarizes 64,199 cyber security
incidents including 2,260 breaches with confirmed data
loss that occurred during 2015 alone.1 Intel Security /
McAfee's conservative estimate of the annual cost to
the global economy from cybercrime is more than $375
billion in losses.2 These attacks targeted all types of
public and private organizations and industries,
highlighting the fact there are no network connected
systems that are immune from online threats.

SmallSat ground networks have unique cyber security
challenges such as: mission-unique equipment and
applications; specialized protocols; high regression test
costs; and tight budgetary constraints. As end-to-end IP
architectures become mainstream in SmallSat ground
networks, additional security challenges are introduced.

SmallSat Tip: SmallSat ground networks are no
exception; they too are exposed to an increasing
number of targeted cyber threats including those
attempting to exploit vulnerabilities not found in most
traditional Information Technology (IT) network
environments.

Mission-unique equipment found in satellite ground
networks primarily consists of radio frequency (RF)
signal processing gear such as: radios, modems,
up/down converters, RF recorders, multiplexers,
telemetry front-end processors, bit synchronizers, and
RF recorders; test equipment such as oscilloscopes,
spectrum analyzers and channel simulators; along with
specialized protocols and applications such as Software
Defined Radio (SDR) and Command & Control (C2)

MISSION-UNIQUE ATTACK SURFACE
Legacy Satellite Ground Networks do not resemble
traditional information systems. Satellite ground
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researchers “Sec” and “Schneider” in their talk entitled
“Iridium Hacking: Please Don’t Sue Us”, demonstrated
how to eavesdrop on Iridium pager communications
using low-cost commodity hardware and open-source
software.4

suites. These niche devices, applications and protocols
present unique attack surfaces for potential exploitation.
A recent study published in 2014 illustrates threats
associated with mission-unique equipment. IOActive
Researchers conducted vulnerability assessments of ten
commercially available satellite communications
terminals. Their findings included numerous severe
security vulnerabilities including weak password reset
mechanisms, backdoors, hard-coded credentials, and
insecure protocols. Attack scenarios for six widely used
Inmarsat and Iridium satellite communications
(SATCOM) terminals describe how vulnerabilities can
be exploited. The impacts of successful attacks could
result in denial of service, data spoofing, execution of
arbitrary code, full remote control of devices and even
physical damage.3

SmallSat Tip: Attacks like this demonstrate that when
possible, it is important to encrypt not only command &
control links, but also telemetry / downlink channels.
Even simplex telemetry containing unencrypted
metadata can lead to potential exploits. One such
exploit is described in a report by Kaspersky Labs
which claims that a Russian-speaking spy gang known
as Turla uses hijacked satellite IP addresses of
legitimate users sent as unencrypted metadata to steal
data from other infected machines in a way that hides
their malware command and control server.5

Unlike traditional network environments which are
primarily concerned with IP based attacks, satellite
ground networks also need to consider RF based
threats. For example, in addition to Internet based
scans, amateur satellite enthusiasts are on the constant
lookout for new satellite feeds detectable using lowcost commodity RF hardware and open-source
software. Online satellite enthusiast resources such as
SatBeams.com, FeedHunter.com and FastSatFinder
.com are used to collaborate and catalog their findings.

RESOURCES AND BEST PRACTICES
Recognizing that SmallSat ground network operators
may lack the resources and budgets of traditional
satellite operators, it is beneficial to leverage lessons
learned, along with frameworks, and tools from
Government and Industry to help better defend their
networks.
The NIST Special Publications (SP) library provides a
wealth of information and resources that can be
leveraged by SmallSat ground network operators who
are just getting started developing a security program.

For example, FastSatFinder.com publishes transponder
frequencies, symbol rates, and polarization information
for 162 Satellites including >7000 channels /
transponder frequencies. Data can be downloaded in
extensible markup language (XML) format for a broad
range of satellites including: ABS, Afghansat,
Amazonas, AMC, Amos, Anik, Apstar, Arabsat, Arsat,
AsiaSat, Astra, AzerSpace, Badr, Brasilsat, ChinaSat,
DirecTV, EchoStar, Eutelsat, Express, G-Sat, Galaxy,
Hellas, Hispasat, Horizons, Insat, Intelsat, JCSat,
KazSat, KoreaSat, MeaSat, N-Sat, Nilesat, Nimiq, NSS,
Optus, PakSat, QuetzSat, SES, Simn Bolvar, Sky
Mexico, Spaceway, Superbird, Telkom, Telstar,
Thaicom, Thor, TKSat, TrkSat, Turkmenlem, Y1A, and
Yamal.

The SP800 series consists of Computer Security related
guidelines, recommendations and reference materials.
The new SP1800 series Cyber Security Practice Guides
provide practical user-friendly guidance to help public
and private sector users adopt a standards-based cyber
security approach.
SmallSat Tip: The list of publications in
Table 1: NIST Special Publications below is not
comprehensive, but serves as a good list to get started
with:

In August 2015 at the Chaos Communication Camp
hacker conference held in Germany, security
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Table 1:

NIST Special Publications

Publication

Title

Link

NIST SP 80037 Rev. 1

Guide for Applying the Risk Management
Framework to Federal Information Systems: A
Security Life Cycle Approach

http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-37r1

NIST SP 80034 Rev. 1

Contingency Planning Guide for Federal
Information Systems

http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication80034r1.pdf

NIST SP 800115

Technical Guide to Information Security Testing
and Assessment

http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-115

NIST SP 800100

Information Security Handbook: A Guide for
Managers

http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-100

NIST SP 80094

Guide to Intrusion Detection and Prevention
Systems (IDPS)

http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-94

NIST SP 80092

Guide to Computer Security Log Management

http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-92

NIST SP 80064 Rev. 2

Security Considerations in the System
Development Life Cycle

http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-64r2

NIST SP 80050

Building an Information Technology Security
Awareness and Training Program

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-50/NIST-SP800-50.pdf

iterative process consisting of the following six steps:
Categorize, Select, Implement, Assess, Authorize, and
Monitor as illustrated in Figure 1 below.

SECURITY PROCESS
Before diving in to the technical controls that are often
the initial thought for network engineers, a solid
security program must include policies and procedures
to help manage the security needs of the organization.
NIST SP guides and frameworks can be used to help
establish and drive policy. Using these tools, such as
the Risk Management Framework and Contingency
Planning Guide, can help an organization get a strong
starting point for security and IT infrastructure beyond
purely hardware related controls.
An overview of the Risk Management Process is
contained in NIST SP 800-37 Guide for Applying the
Risk Management Framework to Federal Information
Systems. The Risk Management Framework is an
Vera

3

30th Annual AIAA/USU
Conference on Small Satellites

SYSTEM HARDENING
NIST 800-53 provides general guidance for security
controls; however controls do not always translate
easily into actionable items that can be implemented on
a system. DISA Security Requirements Guides (SRGs)
are a compilation of Control Correlation Identifiers
(CCIs) which break down NIST SP 800-53 controls
into actionable items, grouped into specific technology
areas such as operating systems, applications,
networking devices, and policy.
DISA STIGs are validated hardening guides, updated
quarterly for major operating systems, applications and
network hardware. Configuring systems in accordance
with applicable STIGs can help to remove or mitigate
configuration vulnerabilities present in satellite ground
network devices. Coupled with a patching program and
routine vulnerability scans, the attack surface of a
ground station network can be minimized.

Figure 1. Risk Management Process Steps
Step 1: Categorize the information systems and the
information they process, store and transmit, based on a
risk/impact analysis. The documentation resulting from
this step will feed into subsequent steps and provide a
thorough description of the systems and operational
environment that can be used for future reference.

The DISA STIG Viewer is a freely available tool that
can be used to complete and document STIG checklists
while implementing system security controls. The
DISA STIG Viewer can be downloaded from
http://iase.disa.mil/stigs/Pages/stig-viewingguidance.aspx.

Step 2: Select the baseline security controls for the
information system, and tailor as needed to meet the
organization’s risk assessment. NIST Special
Publication 800-53 Security and Privacy Controls for
Federal Information Systems and Organizations contain
a comprehensive list of controls grouped by families
that serve as a guide.
Step 3: Implement the selected security controls and
document how they are employed within the
information system and its operational environment.
DISA STIGs and SCAP tools can be used to help
automate and document portions of this step.
Step 4: Assess the security controls to ensure they are
implemented
correctly.
Assessment
can
be
accomplished using automated vulnerability scanners
(i.e.: Nessus) or through manual inspection and
validation. DISA STIGs and SCAP tools can be used to
help automate and document portions of this step.

Figure 2. DISA STIG Viewer
Known vulnerabilities are grouped by severity in CAT
I, CAT II, and CAT III tabs. For each vulnerability, the
tool provides background discussion, steps on how to
determine if the vulnerability is present, and steps
necessary to fix and verify that implementation was
successful.

Step 5: Authorize operation of the information system
based on determination that residual risk is acceptable
to the organization.
Step 6: Monitor information system security controls on
an ongoing basis. Practice good configuration
management to document changes to the system and
operational environment. SIEM and SCAP tools can
help automate and document portions of this step.

Small Sat Tip: Be sure to harden all hosts residing in the
satellite ground network and be careful not to overlook
specialized systems such as oscilloscopes, spectrum
analyzers, and channel simulators. They might not be
thought of as IT systems but often contain a traditional
operating system.

SmallSat Tip: Each step in the process can be tailored to
meet the specific needs of the organization.
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SmallSat ground operators unfamiliar with SCAP tools
should consider exploring the RedHat OpenSCAP
Project, which publishes tools that are freely available
for a number of Linux platforms from:
https://www.open-scap.org. OpenSCAP Base is a NIST
certified command line tool that can be used to perform
configuration and vulnerability scans.

CONTINUOUS MONITORING
Security Information & Event Managers are a product
class that can help organizations to meet their
continuous monitoring requirements through real-time
event processing, alerting and reporting. Market leaders
of SIEM technologies include IBM, HP, Splunk, Intel,
and LogRythm as cited in Gartner’s 2015 Magic
Quadrant for SIEM Report.6 Alienvault is ranked as a
visionary and is responsible for the Open Source
Security Information & Event Manager (OSSIM),
which
is
freely
available
from:
http://www.alienvault.com.

CONCLUSION
Smallsat systems are vulnerable to cyber threats and
care should be taken as ground networks are designed.
The guidelines and tools presented here can help secure
SmallSat ground networks from potential hackers and
cyber threats. SmallSat Ground Operators can benefit
from the resources and tools that are broadly in use
among Government organizations. NIST Special
Publications provide a solid framework for establishing
a comprehensive security program. DISA STIGs and
tools can be used to perform and document information
assurance hardening of SmallSat ground network
devices and applications. Security Information & Event
Managers and SCAP compliant tools help the
organization to continuously monitor security controls
on an ongoing basis.

Figure 3. OSSIM Security Events View
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SmallSat Tip: Challenges associated with implementing
a SIEM for a SmallSat ground network include:
developing custom plug-ins for mission-unique
equipment; monitoring specialized protocols, and
writing rules and scripts for active responses to detected
threats.
Another class of product that can help organizations to
monitor security controls on an ongoing basis is SCAP
validated products.
NIST maintains a list of SCAP validated products that
perform authenticated configuration scanning and
support Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)
here: https://nvd.nist.gov/scapproducts.cfm
Commercial SCAP validated products include: IBM
Big Fix, Rapid 7 Nexpose 6, Microsoft SCAP
Extensions, Tenable Security Center 5, SAINT, RedHat
OpenSCAP 1.0, and Tripwire Enterprise 8.
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